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Over the past decade, the United States has gone from enjoying a small trade surplus with
China to grappling with an enormous deficit. Just to keep the gap from expanding in 1997,
U.S. exports to China would need to grow at an extraordinary rate—four times as fast as
Chinese exports to the United States. Despite recent U.S. gains and China’s efforts at trade 
liberalization, growth on that order appears unlikely, and the trade imbalance can be 
expected to widen in the near term. 
The trade relationship between the United States and
China has changed dramatically in the past ten years. In
1987, the United States benefited from a small trade sur-
plus with China. Today, the U.S.–China merchandise trade
deficit is about $40 billion (Chart 1).1 China’s share of the
total U.S. trade deficit is 25 percent, only slightly smaller
than the 30 percent share held by Japan. Indeed, if recent
trends continue, China will soon replace Japan as the
largest contributor to the overall U.S. merchandise trade
deficit. 
What accounts for this striking change in the U.S. trade
balance with China over the course of a decade?  And how
will the trade balance evolve in the near future?  This edi-
tion of Current Issues identifies several forces that have
enabled China to gain a sizable advantage in trade with the
United States—including high trade barriers, low labor
costs, heavy foreign direct investment in Chinese industry,
and a focus on less expensive consumer goods. The article
also shows, however, that U.S. firms are making important
inroads into Chinese markets in the 1990s. Despite the U.S.
gains, the outlook for the U.S.–China trade deficit is far
from favorable: imports from China so eclipse U.S. exports
to China that even strong growth in U.S. sales is unlikely to
prevent a widening of the deficit in the years ahead. 
Trade with China: Barriers and Restrictions
U.S. trade tensions with China have heated up in the
past year. In the summer of 1996, monthly trade data
revealed that the U.S. deficit with China was poised to
surpass that with Japan. In response, U.S. Commerce
Secretary Mickey Kantor criticized China’s closed mar-
kets, demanding “a level playing field for American
workers and American business” (Greenberger 1996).  
A recent report published by the United States Trade
Representative reveals that many of China’s trade poli-
cies remain restrictive despite efforts at liberalization.
Chart 1
U.S. Trade Deficit with China and Japan
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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May 1997 Volume 3  Number 7The 1997 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade Barriers (pp. 43-59) provides detailed documen-
tation of the limits placed on imports of U.S. goods:
• China’s average tariff rate is 23 percent, and the
maximum tariff is 120 percent. 
• A quota system restricts the types of goods that
can be purchased by domestic Chinese firms. 
• U.S. firms operating in China must obtain per-
mission to import goods, and even with permis-
sion they can sell to the domestic market only
indirectly, through a Chinese trading company.
• U.S. firms exporting to China often face some
form of licensing requirement, such as quality cer-
tification or “automatic registration requirements.”
China does not accept U.S. quality certification on
most products, but instead requires separate
inspections.  Automatic registration requirements
apply to about 400 products, typically electrical
and machinery products. 
U.S. officials have also had to contend with China’s
failure to adequately protect intellectual property
rights. U.S. producers of computer software, video
tapes, and compact discs in particular have suffered
because their products are copied illegally in China,
replacing U.S. exports both to China and to the rest of
the world. In addition, U.S. machinery manufacturers
have charged that China does too little to prevent the
copying of computer software embedded in equipment,
raising the long-run risks of selling these products
in China.
Recently, however, China has taken significant steps
to protect intellectual property rights. These measures
have been prompted in part by U.S. threats of retalia-
tion. In June 1996, the United States, citing violations
of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Enforcement
Agreement signed by the two countries in February
1995, threatened to impose duties on more than
$2 billion worth of Chinese goods.2 China agreed to
start closing factories manufacturing illegal copies of
U.S. products, to shut down spaces showing pirated
movies, and to punish individuals involved in piracy.
China also increased the quotas on imports of audio-
visual items and permitted joint U.S.–Chinese ventures
to reproduce and distribute these products throughout
China. The U.S. government estimates that continued
Chinese efforts to enforce IPR laws could result in an
additional $500 million in U.S. exports (1997 National
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,
pp. 52-3).
Efforts to protect intellectual property rights are
consistent with China’s other efforts to address U.S.
concerns. For example, because of recent reforms,
China’s licensing and quota restrictions now apply to
roughly one-third of all items imported into China,
down from nearly one-half in 1992. Moreover, the aver-
age tariff rate, while still high at 23 percent, has fallen
from almost 36 percent in 1995.
China’s attempts to ease trade restrictions are driven,
in part, by the government’s bid to join the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The key benefit for China would
be greatly improved access to the markets of other
member countries. To maintain its impressive export
growth, China needs to extend the reach of its products
beyond the United States to WTO members that are
now free to put up significant trade barriers to Chinese
goods. As a member of the WTO, China would also
benefit from the organization’s commitment to elimi-
nate quotas on imports of textiles and apparel over the
next ten years. If China’s bid for membership is denied,
Chinese manufacturers of these items will end up at a
significant competitive disadvantage in world markets.
The United States is encouraging China to accelerate
trade liberalization in exchange for its membership in
the WTO (see box).
U.S. Exports to China: A Market Improving
Despite the presence of trade barriers, the United States
has made significant headway in penetrating the huge
Chinese market. In the second half of the 1980s, a
period when the Chinese economy was growing close to
10 percent a year, U.S. exports to China were growing at
a meager average annual rate of 4 percent (Chart 2).
The situation has improved considerably so far in the
1990s. Even with the pause in growth last year, U.S.
exports to China grew at an average annual rate of
16 percent from 1991 to 1996, compared with U.S.
export growth of 11 percent to the rest of developing
Asia and 7 percent to the rest of the world.3 Exports of
capital goods, including industrial machinery, aircraft,
and telecommunications equipment, which make up
nearly half of U.S. sales to China, doubled in that
period. Industrial supplies, mostly chemicals, which
make up another 35 percent of U.S. exports to China,
also doubled.  Food exports, particularly wheat and
corn, which account for most of the remainder of U.S.
sales to China, roughly tripled.4
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China’s attempts to ease trade restrictions
are driven, in part, by the government’s bid
to join the World Trade Organization.The moderate success of the United States in serving
Chinese markets can largely be attributed to the nature
of its exports and to China’s establishment of free-trade
enterprise zones. U.S. firms tend to sell goods that are
either too technologically advanced to be made in
China (for example, aircraft) or produced in insuffi-
cient quantities in China (for example, wheat). The lack
of domestic competitors reduces the incentive for
authorities to place import restrictions on these goods.
In addition, China’s free-trade enterprise zones have
spurred the development of an industrial sector that has
few or no restrictions on imports of capital goods,
materials, and parts as long as the goods are used to
produce exports.
Although specific data are not available, the bulk of
all goods exported from the United States to China
appears to go to firms operating in these free-trade
enterprise zones. By comparing China’s average tariff
rate, 23 percent, with its actual tariff revenue from
3
China’s Bid to Join the World Trade Organization
The United States advocates China’s membership in
the WTO in the interest of accelerating trade liberal-
ization. Because China already has relatively easy
access to U.S. markets, membership would help U.S.
exports to China without having much, if any, impact
on U.S. imports from China. Moreover, the WTO
would impose a legal framework on a country that is
often criticized for its underdeveloped legal system.
China’s membership would also eliminate some of the
need for bilateral trade negotiations between the two
countries because complaints about trade barriers
could be resolved through the WTO’s strong dispute-
settlement process. The WTO’s multilateral panels
would in turn reduce the political tensions related to
confrontations over trade barriers.  
One of the most important points of contention
between the United States and China on the issue of
WTO membership is the pace at which China will
conform to WTO trade laws. The measures required to
gain membership will adversely affect domestic
Chinese firms that currently rely on trade protection
and government subsidies to survive. As a conse-
quence, China wants WTO status as a developing
economy and some flexibility in the time it will take
to conform to WTO standards. The United States,
however, does not view China as a typical developing 
country, given its status as one of the world’s major
exporters, and is pressing for a relatively short time
period for substantial trade liberalization. 
A compromise can be worked out that would allow
China compliance flexibility in the early years in
exchange for a commitment to a program of reforms
over a specific time period that can be monitored and
enforced. China has recently made important conces-
sions. At the WTO meeting in November 1996, China
pledged to reduce the average tariff rate to 15 percent
by the year 2000. In addition, at talks in March 1997
China vowed to grant all Chinese enterprises the right
to trade directly with foreign companies three years
after joining the WTO. U.S. firms would then be free
to market their goods directly to Chinese customers.
China has also promised to adopt WTO standards for
protecting intellectual property rights as soon as it
gains membership.
These commitments by China suggest that opti-
mism is warranted. Some U.S. exporters might be
skeptical about granting immediate membership in
exchange for promises of trade liberalization over
time, but their skepticism would be short-sighted. The
WTO can be a powerful force in opening up the
world’s most populous country to U.S. goods.*
Chart 2
U.S. Exports to China, 1985-96
Source:  U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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* Lardy (1996) discusses issues surrounding China’s membership 
in the WTO.imports, 5 percent, we estimate that most goods flow
into China without any tariff being paid on them.
Indeed, the difference between the average and the 
actual tariff rates implies that roughly 80 percent of all
goods enter China duty-free. The demand from firms in
free-trade enterprise zones has made China one of the
fastest growing export markets for U.S. goods. 
Most products that enter these zones, however,
are used only for exports. Thus, the flip side of this
calculation is that just 20 percent or so of all Chinese
imports appear to make it to China’s domestic markets.
More broadly, tariffs, quotas, licenses, and other trade
barriers on goods sold for domestic use severely limit the
level of U.S. exports to China. In 1996, U.S. exports to
China totaled only $12 billion, or 2 percent of total U.S.
exports.5 This share is less than the share of U.S. exports
to much smaller countries in Asia, including Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan. Overall, the growth in U.S.
exports to China has been more than healthy in the 1990s,
but it has not come close to China’s striking gains in U.S.
markets. 
U.S. Imports from China: A Surge in Demand
U.S. demand for Chinese goods surged in the 1980s,
when U.S. firms were making few advances in China.
From 1985 to 1990, while U.S. exports to China were
rising a mere 4 percent per year, U.S. imports from
China jumped 32 percent per year (Chart 3). From 1991
to 1996, U.S. imports slowed, but maintained an aver-
age annual growth rate of 19 percent, with sales in the
last few years climbing 10 to 15 percent. The inflow
over the past decade has been so rapid that China has
become the fourth largest supplier of goods to the U.S.
market, rising from the fifteenth largest in 1985. Today,
it trails only Canada, Japan, and Mexico. 
How has China achieved such rapid growth in
exports? Low wages, a relatively skilled labor force,
heavy government subsidies, and economies of scale
created by focusing on less expensive consumer goods
have driven China’s advances in world markets.
Consumer durables (such as appliances, toys, cameras,
and home entertainment equipment) and nondurables
(such as apparel and shoes) account for 70 percent of
all U.S. imports from China.  Capital goods, the next
largest category, represent only 15 percent, though
recent rapid growth suggests that these goods will figure
more prominently in the U.S. marketplace over time.
China’s success has come largely at the expense of
other Pacific Rim Asian countries.6 Chinese goods have
increased from less than 4 percent of total U.S. imports
from Asia in 1985 to 18 percent in 1996. The trend in
the consumer goods market is a good illustration of this
shift. Of all U.S. consumer goods imports in 1996,
Chinese products accounted for 27 percent, up from 
12 percent in 1990. During the same period, Japan’s
share fell from 12 percent to 7 percent, while Taiwan
and Hong Kong’s combined share dropped from 
18 percent to 9 percent.
The shift in Asia’s production of consumer goods
sold to the United States is due, in large part, to heavy
foreign direct investment in China by other Asian man-
ufacturers.  The impact of this investment on export
growth is evident in the share of Chinese exports that
are produced by plants either fully or partly owned by
foreign enterprises. In 1985, products from these plants
represented only 2 percent of China’s exports. By 1990,
the share reached 12 percent, and by 1996, the share
was up to 48 percent of total exports (China Statistical
Yearbook, 1996; China Statistical Information and
Service Center 1997). 
Hong Kong has been the major source of foreign
capital in building up China’s production capacity.
China’s State Statistical Bureau reports that about
60 percent of investment in China from 1985 to 1995
originated from Hong Kong. By multiplying this
60 percent share by the 48 percent of total exports from
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Chart 3
U.S. Imports from and Exports to China
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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The moderate success of the United States
in serving Chinese markets can largely
be attributed to the nature of its
exports and to China’s establishment
of free-trade enterprise zones.foreign-owned plants, we arrive at the estimate that
roughly 30 percent of total Chinese exports, or $40 bil-
lion, are tied to Hong Kong firms. We estimate that
firms tied to Taiwan, which represent 8 percent of total
foreign direct investment, are responsible for another
$5 billion in exports. Altogether, roughly $45 billion of
total Chinese exports are traceable to investments by
Hong Kong and Taiwanese firms.7 The percentage of this
$45 billion that goes to the United States, while unknown,
is probably quite high, making the investment in China by
Hong Kong and Taiwan a substantial contributing factor
in the U.S.–China trade deficit.
Japanese investment, so far, has been relatively mod-
est. Chinese data indicate that Japan accounts for slightly
less than 8 percent of total foreign direct investment from
1985 to 1995, implying that roughly $5 billion of Chinese
exports are tied to Japanese multinationals (China
Statistical  Yearbook, 1996, pp. 581, 596). Thus, to date,
investment by Japanese firms appears to have been only a
modest contributor to the increase in the U.S. trade deficit
with China.
The Outlook for the U.S.–China Trade Imbalance
In the years ahead, U.S. exports to China should continue
to grow rapidly. Growth in China’s economy of about
10 percent per year combined with continued trade
liberalization will make China a rich market for U.S.
exports. Even though sales to China stalled in 1996,
growth in the range of 15 to 20 percent is plausible over
the rest of the decade. As for U.S. imports, growth in the
demand for Chinese goods should hold its recent pace of
about 10 to 15 percent, down from the near 30 percent
rate recorded in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Such a favorable shift in import and export trends,
however, will not prevent a further widening of the
U.S.–China trade gap. Because imports from China are
four times the size of U.S. exports to China, U.S. exports
to China would need to grow four times faster than
imports just to keep the deficit at its current level.8 The
problem created by such a large imbalance is illustrated by
the U.S. experience in 1995 (Chart 4). In 1994, the U.S.
trade deficit with China was $29 billion. In 1995, U.S.
exports to China grew 27 percent, while U.S. imports from
China rose 14 percent—yet the bilateral deficit increased
$5 billion that year. Without a dramatic acceleration in
U.S. export growth, the U.S.–China trade deficit will con-
tinue to widen in the near term.9And aggressive moves by
the United States to promote its exports to keep the gap
from expanding further can only fuel trade tensions
between the two countries.
Conclusion
Since 1985, the United States has gone from enjoying a
small trade surplus with China to coping with a widen-
ing deficit. U.S. imports from China have grown
rapidly, with Chinese goods replacing U.S. imports
from other Asian countries. However, U.S. exports,
largely because of China’s restrictive trade policies,
have not kept up. Although U.S. exports to China have
grown roughly twice as fast as U.S. exports to the rest
of the world in the 1990s, they remain well below the
level of exports to smaller economies in Asia.
Over the near term, strong growth of U.S. exports to
China will likely continue, boosted by the strength of the
Chinese economy and lower trade barriers. At the same
time, U.S. imports from China will likely maintain their
recent pace, which will help stem the growth in the trade
gap. To reduce the U.S.–China trade deficit in 1997,
however, U.S. exports will need to grow more than four
times faster than U.S. imports from China—an unlikely
scenario.  The recent defusing of conflict over intellectual
property rights and the efforts by China to join the WTO
will work to moderate tensions between the two coun-
tries.  The potential for troublesome disputes remains,
however, as the U.S. trade deficit with China threatens to
surpass that with Japan.
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Chart 4
The Math of the U.S.–China Trade Deficit
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Low wages, a relatively skilled labor 
force, heavy government subsidies,
and economies of scale created by focusing
on less expensive consumer goods have driven
China’s advances in world markets.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Notes
1.  The trade data used here are from the U.S. Commerce
Department.  Legitimate questions have been raised about whether
U.S. data accurately capture exports to China that are shipped
through Hong Kong.  Fung and Lau (1996) claim that correcting for
this and other errors lowers the U.S.–China bilateral deficit. For
example, they estimate that the deficit was $7 billion in 1990 (com-
pared with the U.S. estimate of $11 billion) and $24 billion in 1995
(compared with the U.S. estimate of $35 billion). Although their
estimates are significantly lower than the official U.S. estimates,
the deterioration in percentage terms is essentially the same.
2. This dispute occurred around the time of the annual U.S. debate on
China’s most favored nation (MFN) status. Arguments against con-
tinuing China’s MFN status—which gives that country trade treat-
ment “no less favorable” than that given the most favored nation—
usually center around questions of human rights violations.
Nonetheless, the United States has consistently renewed China’s
MFN status.
3. For the period 1990-95, average U.S. export growth to China
was even more impressive—20 percent according to the U.S.
Commerce Department. Fung and Lau (1996) estimates put U.S.
export growth at 22 percent from 1990 to 1995.
4. Consumer goods accounted for 4 percent of U.S. exports to
China in 1996; autos made up another 1 percent. 
5. Fung and Lau (1996) add roughly $5 billion, raising China’s
share of total U.S. exports from 2 percent to 3 percent. 
6. The U.S. experience with Chinese imports differs from that with
Japanese goods in the 1980s. U.S. firms view Chinese imports as less
threatening because they are largely replacing items from other Asian
countries rather than goods produced in the United States.  By con-
trast, Japanese exports competed much more directly with U.S. goods. 
7. Because of strained relations between China and Taiwan, it is
likely that some of the investment attributed to Hong Kong origi-
nated in Taiwan (see Lardy [1995]).
8. The alternative calculations of Fung and Lau (1996) yield a dif-
ferent ratio of imports to exports. Their numbers suggest that U.S.
exports need to grow two and a half times faster to keep the
deficit unchanged. 
9. Over the long term, the gap will eventually close if U.S. exports
to China continue to grow faster than U.S. imports from China.
For example, if U.S. exports to China were to grow 20 percent
each year and U.S. imports from China 10 percent, the gap would
disappear in seventeen years. The mathematics are such, however,
that the deficit would not begin to decline until 2006 and would
not fall below its 1996 level until 2010.
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